CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: DOES LEGAL ORIGINS MATTER?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2478/eoik-2025-0075Keywords:
central bank independence, monetary policy, inflation, Legal Origin, Law and Finance, quality of institutionsAbstract
Legal Origins and Law and Finance literature, despite heavy criti-
cism, shows vivid examples of how legal traditions affect economic
and political institutions with strong consequences for financial sys-
tems. Is there a relation between Legal Origins and central bank inde-
pendence (CBI)? The research idea of the paper is based on prediction
that Legal Origins could related to formal status, but more likely affect
factual status. From the empirical side it is found that the level of
CBI varies in countries with different legal traditions. Such difference
was widened during the time of CBI reforms around the globe, so
Common Law countries demonstrate the lowest level of CBI among
others. ANOVA and Fisher LSD test confirm the statistical signifi-
cance of differences in CBI across Legal Origins. In terms of inflation
performance, the situation is not the same. Common Law countries
are neither the best nor worst inflation performers, saying that, low-
er formal CBI may coexist with a better inflation situation. Results
of Correspondence Analysis confirm that all together lower levels of
CBI and inflation compared to the group mean are in statistically sig-
nificant ties with the Common Law proxy during the 1980-2023 and
2000-2023 period, while rule of law and sovereign wealth funds prox-
ies are significant only during 2000-2023. From the theoretical side, it
means that Legal Origin matters for CBI, especially after comprehen-
sive reforms of monetary institutions, yet the channels of its influence
on central banks should be investigated further.
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